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Abstract

This article is the second and final part of the overview of major events and policy
issues in EC competition law in 2003, following on from last month’s journal (
[2004] I.C.C.L.R. 19). This part of the article is divided into three sections: (1) European Commission decisions on cartels, joint ventures/horizontal co-operation,
distribution and Articles 82/86 EC. (2) An outline of current policy issues, including competition and the liberal professions, review of the liner conference block
exemption, and the modernisation of Article 82 EC enforcement. (3) A survey
of areas of specific interest, focusing mainly on recent Commission activity as
regards competition and gas supply, with brief notes on the Commission’s leased
lines sectoral enquiry and what the Commission has been doing in sport and media.
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This article is the second and final part of the
overview of major events and policy issues in EC
competition law in 2003, following on from last
month’s journal ( [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 19). This part of
the article is divided into three sections:
(1) European Commission decisions on cartels,
joint ventures/horizontal co-operation, distribution and Articles 82/86 EC.
(2) An outline of current policy issues, including competition and the liberal professions,
review of the liner conference block exemption, and the modernisation of Article 82 EC
enforcement.
(3) A survey of areas of specific interest, focusing mainly on recent Commission activity as
regards competition and gas supply, with
brief notes on the Commission’s leased lines
sectoral enquiry and what the Commission
has been doing in sport and media.

Overview of major events (continued)
European Commission decisions
Cartels
Cartel enforcement has continued apace. The Commission emphasised in 2002 the creation of a second cartel unit, but this has been disbanded as the
Commission generally reorganised on sectoral
lines in anticipation of the next 10-State ‘‘Enlargement’’ in May 2004.1 Again, there have been many
new decisions (see Table 5 overleaf).
We have not yet seen a revised Notice on fining
guidelines, although Mr Rocca has been talking
about fining and, above all, about deterrence.2 The
key idea appears to be that large firms should be
1. IP/03/603, April 30, 2003. The contact procedure for
leniency applications on the Commission’s website remains.
2. Arbault, EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter, no.2 (Summer 2003), pp.1–7.



fined more, because they should know better and
can afford to police themselves better, and the
Commission wants to hit hard and one time only
to deter, rather than pursue multiple proceedings
against large companies. Equally, that in small
markets, small firms should be fined less. Both
themes are reflected in the Commission’s decisions
published this year.
There has also been talk about electronic
searches for information.3 In this context, it may
be interesting to note that the Dutch Competition
Authority, the NMA, has now published guidelines
on such searches.
There is also more international co-operation in
dawn raids now. Thus, in February 2003, the Commission announced that there had been coordinated inspections on companies producing
plastic additives related to the production of PVC,
heat stabilisers, impact modifiers and processing
aids on three continents, involving EU, US,
Canadian and Japanese competition authorities.4
Finally, there have also been new issues about
the confidentiality of corporate leniency disclosures, as plaintiff groups have applied for them, and
other evidence, in the Austrian Banks Case under
the EC’s new transparency regulations.5
Methylglucamines
On November 27, 2002, the Commission fined
Aventis Pharma and Rhône-Poulenc Biochemie
(both in the Aventis Group) e2.85 million for
participating in a price-fixing and market-sharing
cartel with Merck KgaA from 1990 until 1999.6
Methylglucamine is a chemical used for the synthesis of x-ray media, pharmaceuticals and colourings. Merck was granted full immunity because it
revealed the cartel to the Commission and provided
decisive evidence on the cartel’s operation. Aventis
and Rhône-Poulenc were granted a 40 per cent
reduction for co-operation in the investigation.
The market concerned is very small in size (e3.1
million in 1999).
Plasterboard
On November 27, 2002, the Commission fined
plasterboard producers Lafarge, BPB, Gebrüder
Knauf Westdeutsche Gipswerke and Gyproc
Benelux a total of e478 million for a cartel covering
the four main markets in the European Union
(Benelux, Germany, France and the United Kingdom).7 This was the second highest fine ever
imposed for an infringement, after the Vitamins
3. 2002 EC Commission Competition Report, paras
683–684.
4. MEMO/03/33, February 13, 2003.
5. Notice of action brought in Case T-2/03, VKI v Commission [2003] O.J. C-55/37.
6. IP/02/1746, November 27, 2002.
7. IP/02/1744, November 27, 2002.
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Table 5: Cartels
— Overview:
Total fines
(e million)
e2.85
e478.00
e20.56
e60.60
e85.00
e16.70
e134.40

Methylglucamines
Plasterboard
Food flavour enhancers
Specialty graphites
Concrete-reinforcing bars
French beef
Sorbates
— Themes:
 deterrence ... and ‘‘multi-product’’ companies;
 big and small fines;
 transparency disclosures?
 cross-border retaliation as effect on trade/‘‘group effect’’ (Dutch Gases/Belgian Beer);
 State action reducing fines.

Cartel Case (e855 million in December 2001).
Lafarge was fined e249.6 million, BPB e138.6
million. These companies were found to have restricted competition in these markets, exchanged
information on sales volumes and informed one
another of price increases on the German and UK
markets. Lafarge, BPB and Knauf were found to
have participated in the cartel from 1992 to 1998,
Gyproc from 1996 to 1998.
In contrast to methylglucamine, the Commission
noted that plasterboard is a very large market, some
e1.2 billion in 1997. Lafarge was also given a greater
fine for deterrence because its overall size was five
times that of BPB or Knauf. Lafarge and BPB also
had their fines increased for recidivism, Lafarge
having participated in the cement cartel, and a
subsidiary of BPB having participated in the
cartonboard cartel. The Commission’s argument
is that at the time when these decisions were
notified to them, the two companies were participating in another restrictive agreement in which
they persisted.
Food flavour enhancers
On December 17, 2002, the Commission fined
Japanese and South Korean companies a total of
e20.56 million for a price-fixing and customer
allocation cartel in relation to ‘‘nucleotides’’, or
nucleic acid.8 This product is made from glucose
and used to add flavour to foods. The cartel was
found to have operated from 1988 to 1998.
One Japanese company, Takeda Chemical Industries (Japan), was granted full immunity (under
the 1996 Leniency Notice) because it submitted
decisive evidence at a time when the Commission
did not know of the cartel. Ajinomoto Co Inc (Japan)
was fined e15.54 million, Cheil Jedong Corporation
(Korea) e2.74 million, and Daesant Corporation
(Korea) e2.28 million.

Highest individual fines
(e million)
Aventis was fined e2.85
Lafarge was fined e249.6
Ajinomoto was fined e15.5
SGL was fined e27.75
Ria Acciaio was fined e26.9
FNSEA was fined e12
Hoechst was fined e99

Specialty graphites
On December 17, 2002, the Commission fined
seven companies a total of e60.6 million for taking
part in a price-fixing cartel on the market for
isostatic specialty graphites.9 The companies concerned were SGL Carbon (Germany), Le CarboneLorraine (France), Ibiden Co, Tokai Carbon Co,
Toyo Tanso Co Ltd and Nippon Steel Chemicals
Co (Japan), Intech EDM BV and Intech EDM AG
(Netherlands), and Graftech International (formerly UCAR) (United States).
SGL Carbon was also fined e8.81 million for its
involvement with GraphTech International in pricefixing collusion affecting the market in extruded
speciality graphite.
GraphTech International was granted full immunity for both infringements, because it revealed
the existence of the cartels and provided decisive
evidence on them.
Concrete-reinforcing bars
Again on December 17, 2002, the Commission fined
nine undertakings a total of e85 million for their
participation, together with a trade association, in a
cartel covering the Italian concrete-reinforcing bars
market.10
The case reflects the changeover from the ECSC
Treaty to the EC Treaty in so far as the cartel
infringed Article 65(1) ECSC, which expired in
July 2002, and the Commission continued the procedure under the EC rules.11 The companies were
found to have fixed prices for ‘‘size extras’’, the basic
prices and standard payment terms, and to have
restricted or controlled production and/or sales.
The fines ranged from e26.9 million (Riva
Acciaio) to e3.57 million (Ferriere Nord). Fines on
Riva and Lucchini reflected the fact that these
companies are in major groups whose turnover is
9. IP/02/1906, December 17, 2002.
10. IP/02/1908, December 17, 2002.
11. The Commission’s Communication of June 26, 2002,
[2002] O.J. C152/5.

8. IP/02/1907, December 17, 2002.
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much bigger than the other members of the cartel.
The trade association involved, Federacciai, was
found to have infringed, but was not fined. Ferriere
Nord’s fine was increased for recidivism. However,
because it also co-operated with the Commission,
its fine was reduced. The other companies involved
were Alfa Acciai, Feralpi Siderugica, IRO Industrie
Riunite Odolesi, Leali and Acciaiere e Ferriere
Leali Luigi in liquidation, Siderpotenza, Valsablia
Investimenti, and Ferrara Valsablia (nine undertakings, eleven companies in total).
Table 6: French beef
‘‘I arranged for a cross-industry meeting to be held
this morning at eight-thirty in order to get everyone
to face their responsibilities.
‘‘People are now negotiating with the help of the
Ministry, which is trying to iron out any difficulties.
I would like to get downstream undertakings to agree
to stop purchasing abroad for a few weeks, or indeed
a few months. Of course, I have no means of obliging
them to do so, the State cannot force them to do so ...
‘‘I would like to get all parties to agree to a fair
purchasing price scale.’’12
Commission fine reductions
 minus 60 per cent for the crisis;
 minus 30 per cent for State encouragement.

French beef
In April 2003, the Commission took an interesting
decision imposing relatively small fines on six
French federations in the beef sector for unlawful
price-fixing and measures to block imports. The
context was the falling price of beef in a secondary
phase of the BSE crisis. The Commission appears to
have been keen to underline that even those circumstances cannot entitle private parties to pursue
blatant infringements.13
What appears to have happened is that when
beef prices collapsed in October 2001, French
farmers started to block imports of foreign beef
with so-called ‘‘inspections’’ of trucks to see where
livestock was coming from, and sometimes violent
blockades of French slaughterhouses.
Keen to resolve such unrest, the French
agriculture minister actively encouraged what
was called a ‘‘cross-industry agreement’’ between
four French farmers’ unions and two French
slaughterhouse unions. This agreement provided
for the purchase of beef at certain (minimum) prices
and the boycott of imported beef (which was
usually cheaper). There were various press reports
which were picked up by the Commission,
resulting in letters to the French Government and
dawn raids on the unions concerned. As a result,
the actual agreement was short-lived. However, it
12. Document 38.279/309 and 310.
13. Commission Press Release IP/03/479, April 2, 2003;
Decision [2003] O.J. L209/12.



appears that, in practice, the agreement was
continued as a ‘‘recommendation’’ from the unions
concerned, in fact implemented by local action.
There were some exceptions, where slaughterhouses refused to comply with the demands made
of them, but the decision notes extensive evidence
of ‘‘covert’’ implementation of this type. The Commission found that the infringement continued
from October 2001 until January 2002.
Various aspects of the case are interesting. First,
there have not been many straight cartel cases in
the agricultural sector at EC level, although there
have been quite a few cases on auctions and cooperatives and there have also been agricultural
cases at national level.
Secondly, this is another classic example of how
government encouragement can be a trap for all
private parties concerned. The French minister
stressed that he could not oblige the unions to agree,
but had them on his premises to ‘‘encourage’’ them
to do so. France had also unlawfully banned imports of beef from the United Kingdom at that time.
Thirdly, predictably the French unions sought
refuge in Regulation 26/62, but such claims were
rejected by the Commission on the basis that the
exception in Art.2(1) is very narrow. (It is necessary
for agreement to be between farmers alone, to show
that all the objectives of (what is now) Art.33(1) EC
were met and that the agreement is necessary to that
end.)
Fourthly, this is unusual in so far as the fine is on
the ‘‘unions’’ concerned. The Commission stresses
that activity within the scope of legitimate trade or
professional union representation is not within
Art.81(1) EC, but where, as here, such activity is
considered to go outside that representation, it is
caught by Art.81(1) EC if the activity has restrictive
effects on inter-state trade.14
Fifthly, the fines were very low, as the Commission gave extensive credit for the exceptional
economic context, or, as one defendant put it, ‘‘the
human crisis’’ which developed beyond the economic one, as farmers faced acute hardship.
The Commission started predictably by considering an agreement on minimum prices and
blocking imports as ‘‘very serious’’. In order to
assess the relative strength of the unions, the Commission decided not to look at market shares and
looked instead at the ratio between the amount of
the annual membership fees collected by each of
the farmers’ federations to assess their relative size
and responsibility.15 The infringement was of short
duration. The Commission treated the farmers’
violence to compel slaughterhouse co-operation
as an aggravating circumstance, justifying a 30 per
cent increase on basic amounts and the covert
continuation to have justified another 20 per cent.
14. Para.112.
15. Para.170.
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The fines on the slaughterhouse federations were
reduced by 30 per cent because of the ‘‘forceful’’
French Government pressure to conclude the
agreement and a further 30 per cent for the ‘‘very
special situation’’ they faced with ‘‘physical coercion’’ from farmers.
However, beyond this, the Commission stated
that this is the first decision to penalise an agreement concluded entirely between ‘‘unions’’ and
which relates to a basic agricultural product and
involves two links in the production chain.16
As a result, the Commission considered the
specific economic context and concluded that this
‘‘went beyond a straightforward collapse in prices
or the presence of a well-known disease’’. The
Commission had emphasised earlier in the decision that various measures had been taken under
the Common Market organisation for beef in order
to attenuate these circumstances, suggesting therefore that further action (of the type challenged here)
was not justified. When assessing the specific context, however, the Commission notes such measures
as evidence of the exceptional circumstances.17 Accordingly, the fines were reduced by 60 per cent,
rather than the more usual 10–15 per cent for an
‘‘industry in crisis’’. The farmers’ unions were fined
between e12 million and e600,000; the slaughterhouse unions between e720,000 and e480,000.
Sixthly, as will be apparent from the above, the
Commission did not treat the pressure on the
slaughterhouse federation as enough to deny
the existence of an agreement at all.
Finally, for once it is the Commission rather than
the defendant that emphasises that the effects were
uncertain. It appears that imports of beef rose in
early 2002, but the Commission is careful to note
that it is not clear that this was because the agreement ended.18
Sorbates
On October 2, 2003, the Commission fined four
producers of a chemical preservative called a
‘‘sorbate’’ a total of e134.4 million for a price-fixing
and market-allocating cartel between 1978 and
1995–96.19 Sorbates are used to prevent the
development of moulds, bacteria and other microorganisms in foods and beverages. They are also
used for the coating of wrapping paper or in cosmetics. There was one European (Hoechst) and four
Japanese participants. The case started through
a leniency application by one of the Japanese
companies (Chisso Corporation), which received
full immunity. Hoechst was fined e99 million,
apparently reflecting increases for recidivism and
being a co-leader in the cartel with Daicel Chemical
Industries, together with a reduction of 50 per cent
16.
17.
18.
19.

Para.181.
Para.185.
Para.78.
IP/03/1330, October 2, 2003.



for co-operation in the investigation. Daicel was
fined e16.6 million, Ueno Fine Chemicals e12.3
million, and the Nippon Synthetic Chemical Industry Co e10.5 million.
Beer decision
In August 2003, the Commission published its
decision in the Belgian Brewers—Bilateral Cartel
and Private Label Cases.20
It may be recalled that this case related to two
infringements: a form of co-operation or ‘‘nonaggression pact’’ between Danone Alken-Maes and
Interbrew in Belgium; and concentration in offers
for private beer supply. The main interest in the
case lies in the finding that Danone demanded a
‘‘500,000 hl’’ transfer of business, threatening
otherwise to destroy Interbrew’s business in
France.21 This was treated as evidence of effect on
trade.22 It was also relevant to recidivism, since
Danone (as opposed to Alken-Maes in Belgium)
had been found to have infringed the competition
rules through cartels before.23
Otherwise, the Commission decided, based on
the gravity of the infringement, to set the basic
amount for the non-aggression pact at e45 million
for Interbrew and e25 million for Danone, in part
because of market share and apparently also in part
because Interbrew and Danone are large international undertakings and because Danone is a
‘‘multi-product company’’. The amounts are perhaps not so remarkable, but the view that international and/or multi-product companies should
be fined more is, this author thinks, highly questionable. Fines should relate to infringements, not
whether companies are conglomerates or not, especially if they can be fined more for recidivism on
other markets in any event. The final amounts of the
fines were e45.6 million for Interbrew and e44
million for Danone. In the Private Label Case,
Interbrew’s fine (e812,000) was increased by a
factor of five, and that of Alken-Maes (e585,000)
by a factor of two.24
Vitamins decision
In January 2003, the Commission published its
decision in the Vitamins Cartel Case.25 It will be
recalled that this case involved proceedings related
to 12 vitamin markets. The Commission dealt with
several infringements in one decision without,
however, treating them as a single conspiracy
(albeit that the same people were involved in
Hoffmann La Roche and other companies). The
Commission stressed also that no producer was
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

[2003] O.J. L200/1. See also [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 59–60.
Para.53.
Paras 271–273.
Paras 314–316.
Para.344. See also [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 57–58.
[2003] O.J. L6/1.
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held responsible for collusion in products in which
it was not involved.
The value of the EEA market in such products
was some e800 million in 1998. The Commission
noted the different sizes of the companies concerned and their market shares in the products
concerned. Infringements varied in duration between 1989 and 1999. Some were not subject to
fines on account of the five-year prescription rule.
Interestingly, in deciding to apply differential
treatment to the companies involved, the Commission looked at their relative importance in
each of the product markets concerned and their
worldwide product turnover, since each cartel was
global.26 At the same time, the Commission states
that there is no overlap with fines from other
jurisdictions such as the United States because its
fine is only for restrictions on competition in the
European Union/EEA.27 As a result, for example,
the basic amount of the fine of Hoffmann La Roche
for vitamin A was increased from e20 million to e30
million. Taking account of their size and overall
resources, the fines on BASF, Hoffmann La Roche
and Aventis were also increased by 100 per cent for
deterrence.
Hoffmann La Roche’s basic amount was
increased by 50 per cent for its leadership role,
and similarly that of BASF by 35 per cent. Aventis
obtained a 100 per cent reduction in some markets,
since it was the first undertaking to offer decisive
evidence on two of the vitamin cartels (and otherwise met the conditions of the 1996 Leniency
Notice). Hoffman La Roche and BASF also provided such evidence but had lesser (50 per cent)
reductions as instigators of the cartels concerned.
The key point to understand Hoffmann La
Roche’s huge fine was the accumulation of its fines
for each infringement, each of which had been
increased for ‘‘differential treatment’’ of the companies concerned, and for ‘‘sufficient deterrence’’,
with also a 50 per cent increase for having a leadership role. The total fine for Hoffmann La Roche was
e462 million.
Finally, an interesting procedural point is that
the companies were given the opportunity to comment on the written replies of the other parties to
the statement of objections at the Oral Hearing.28
Soda Ash 2 decision (and new appeal)
In January 2003, the Commission published its second decision in the Solvay, CFK, Soda Ash Case.29
This decision is essentially the same decision as the
Commission took in 1990, which the CFI annulled
for lack of proper authentication in 1995. The Commission again imposes a fine of e3 million for a
market-sharing agreement lasting three years, now
26.
27.
28.
29.

Paras 678–681.
Para.773.
Para.147.
[2003] O.J. L10/1.



almost a modest sum in comparison to more modern
fines. The Commission notes that the appeal proceedings (CFI and ECJ) took some eight years and
nine months, during which time the prescription
period in Regulation 2988/74 was suspended.
One can but note that all this takes far too long,
even if one can understand how it happens. In this
case, Solvay’s appeal was lodged in May 1991, the
CFI ruled in June 1995, and the ECJ in April 2000.
German banks—Euro-zone Case decision
In January 2003, the Commission published its
decision in the German Banks (Euro-zone Currency
Exchange) Case.30 In this case, the Commission
fined five German banks between e28 million and
e2.8 million for setting an agreed commission of
some 3 per cent for the buying and selling of eurozone bank rates during the three-year transitional
period to the introduction of the euro (January 1999
to January 2002). The purpose was to recover some
90 per cent of the ‘‘exchange margin’’ income which
banks had made from currency exchange, after the
abolition of the ‘‘spread’’ between buying and selling rates for national currencies.
The Commission’s key point was that there was
no need for the banks to standardise the prices
concerned, the charging structure or any other
service concept. It may be recalled that the bulk of
European banks settled similar proceedings with
changes to their practices during 2001. Among
other things, the banks argued that the service in
question was local in nature and hence this was a
purely national case.31 The Commission’s view was
that the service of exchanging the currencies of
other EU Member States was ‘‘already cross-border
in nature’’.32 The ‘‘basic amounts’’ for the fines on
the large banks concerned were all increased by
100 per cent for deterrence.
Dutch industrial and medical gases decision
In May 2003, the Commission published its decision in the Dutch Industrial and Medical Gases
Case33 (with a rectification decision in May 200334).
This decision is unusual in various ways and merits
a close reading.
Essentially, the case relates to agreements between suppliers of industrial and medical gases in
liquid (bulk) form and in cylinders (such as Hoek
Loos, ASA Air Liquide, and others) in the
Netherlands. They were found to have agreed:



To raise prices;
not to compete for customers in periods after
each price increase so that such increases
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

[2003] O.J. L15/1. See also [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 62–63.
Para.153.
Para.156.
[2003] O.J. L84/1. See also [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 63.
[2003] O.J. L123/49.
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worked (so-called annual ‘‘cease-fires’’ or
‘‘moratoria’’); and
to co-ordinate certain other trading conditions for various periods between 1989
and 1991 and 1993 and 1997.

A first issue is the effect on trade. Importantly,
based on various merger control cases, the Commission found that the geographic market for the
supply of industrial gasses in bulk form and in
cylinders is limited by high transport costs and is
therefore local or regional.35 Governmental regulations on the use of cylinders reinforced the view
that markets were national. The Commission
concluded that the market for bulk supply was
also national.
Unusually, the Commission included in its cartel decision an assessment of market concentration,
including (Herfindahl-Herschmann Index) ‘‘HHI’’
figures showing concentration exceeding 1,800 in
each market. The Commission also assessed competition in such circumstances, including the likelihood of retaliation in the event of customer loss.36
It is not entirely clear why the Commission took
this unusual step for a cartel decision. However, it
may be in relation to effect on trade, since in the
absence of evidence of actual cross-border trade
flows, the Commission argues that one way in
which trade may be affected in the case is because
retaliation may be cross-border, on other geographic markets.37
The Commission also argued that trade between
Member States can be affected because swaps between companies, which may be cross-border, may
be affected. The Commission noted that there are
considerable imports and exports of industrial
gases which ‘‘concern almost exclusively sales
and swaps within industrial gases groups or between such groups’’.38
Furthermore, the Commission argued that the
infringement could affect the financial flows
within a group and the profitability of a branch
within a group ‘‘because of changes in dividend
payments or investment funds needed’’ (a reference
back to the old German insurance case—Verband
der Sachversicherer).39 The Commission also argued that the downstream customers for the gases
will be affected, in so far as they export or compete
with imports.
It will be interesting to see what the CFI makes of
this. At first sight, these elements appear remote
and unconvincing. Unsurprisingly, Air Liquide is
contesting the Commission’s approach, arguing
that the issue is whether the infringements affect
trade, not the fact that the parties are in multinational groups or might compete through
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Paras 64 et seq.
Paras 77 et seq.
Para.372.
Paras 366 et seq.
Para.371.

retaliation in other national markets. In the circumstances, the case looks far more like a Dutch case,
which (at least after May 2004) one would expect to
be passed to the Dutch Competition Authority to
apply Dutch and/or EC competition law.
A second issue in the case is duration. Here, the
Commission lacked evidence of one single continuous infringement from 1989 to 1991 (in other
words, no evidence of meetings or other unlawful
exchanges of information in 1991–93). As a result,
the Commission accepted that the earlier period
was covered by prescription.40
A third issue was the liability of BOC for the acts
of its subsidiary, in so far as there was no evidence
that the group was aware of infringements at the
time. Again a little surprisingly, the Commission
appears to infer responsibility from the fact that the
same internal and external counsel represented the
subsidiary!41 On the other hand, the Commission
appears to have fined BOC only on the basis of its
local involvement.
A fourth issue is the effect of the anti-competitive
behaviour, the Commission recording extensively
argued price increases of the cartel members. The
companies concerned, on the other hand, noted an
erosion of prices between 1990 and 1999.
Interestingly, as in the French Beef Case, the Commission accepted that causation in cases like this
can be complex. Nevertheless, the Commission
followed its usual line, suggesting that the cartel
members would not have carried on repeatedly
meeting if the cartel were perceived as having no
impact.42
Finally, the Commission includes an interesting
section on the issue as to whether a cartel infringement with limited geographical scope should be
treated as ‘‘serious’’ or ‘‘very serious’’ in terms of the
Commission’s fining guidelines. The Commission’s general position is that an infringement of
limited geographic scope may be categorised as a
‘‘serious’’ infringement, but accepts no obligation to
deviate from the general rule that a price cartel is by
its nature a ‘‘very serious infringement’’.43 It appears
that the Commission also looked at the general
scope of effects related to the infringement, the
level of participation in the companies (i.e. whether
only at local subsidiary level or higher) and the
economic significance of the sector concerned
(where the Commission noted, for example, that
banking is of ‘‘outstanding importance’’ for the
economy as a whole44). Since its decision, the
Commission has also conceded a factual mistake
in the assessment of one company’s participation
going to the duration and therefore reduced the fine
on that company by a corresponding amount.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.



Paras 387–388.
Para.401.
Paras 418–421.
Para.425.
Paras 423–427.
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Zinc phosphates decision
In June 2003, the Commission published its decision in the Zinc Phosphates Case.45 Zinc phosphate is a product used as an anti-corrosion mineral
pigment in protective coating systems. The main
points of interest regarding the decision are:




The explicit way that the Commission details
how the cartel members divided up sales to
customers; and
the Commission’s statement that it is not its
practice to look at the size of the product
market as a relevant factor to assess the gravity of an infringement (i.e. whether it is ‘‘very
serious’’ or ‘‘serious’’), but that it does look at
the geographical scope of the market for that
purpose. In this case, the Commission took
into consideration the limited size of the
product market.46 In practice, this meant
that, taking into account also the EEA turnover of the different participants, the largest
basic amount before duration increases was
only e3 million.

Seamless steel tube decision
In June 2003, the Commission published its decision in the Seamless Steel Tubes Case.47 This
decision was actually taken three and a half years
ago, in December 1999. Essentially, the case
involved a market-sharing agreement between
European and Japanese producers for certain seamless carbon-steel pipes and tubes called ‘‘oil
country tubular goods’’ and ‘‘line pipes’’ used for
transporting oil and gas.
The industry has been in crisis since the 1970s,
with significant overcapacity (which in 1999 was
some 40 per cent). The arrangement was found to
have operated from 1977 until 1995, but interestingly, in view of voluntary export restraints and
similar measures concluded between the Commission and Japan between 1972 and 1990, the
Commission only took into account the period
from 1990 onwards.48 Fines also reflected the fact
that the sales of the companies concerned in the
European Union were only some e73 million per
year.49

to 3G mobile network sharing in the United Kingdom and Germany, with two decisions clearing
the arrangements on slightly modified terms.50 It
will be recalled51 that the agreements in the United
Kingdom are between T-Mobile and mmO2 and
provide for site sharing and national roaming.52
The Commission has now concluded that the site
sharing is not caught by Article 81(1) EC, because:




It only concerns basic network infrastructure, allowing the parties to differentiate
their services downstream and compete; and
the system did not lead to widespread foreclosure for third-party operators (even if
there were particular problem sites, national
regulators could also impose site sharing).

Environmental and health considerations were
also taken into account.53
As regards national roaming between network
providers, the Commission concluded that this
limits competition with respect to coverage, retail
prices, quality and transmission speeds. However,
it also promotes market entry, leading to a better
and quicker 3G service ‘‘roll-out’’ and coverage.
The Commission’s position (reflecting that of the
parties) varies according to the nature of the area
concerned. National roaming in rural areas of the
United Kingdom is exempted until December 31,
2008. In urban areas, such roaming is exempted until
December 31, 2007, the parties having indicated
that they would not enter into such agreements in
the 10 largest cities, but only in some small cities
covering less than 10 per cent of the UK population.
The agreements in Germany are again between
T-Mobile and mmO2 and follow a similar pattern,
with exemption variations on national roaming
according to the circumstances.
Canal Digital

In April and July 2003, the Commission followed
up on its Article 19(3) Notices of last year related

In June 2003, the Commission issued an Article 19(3)
Notice indicating that it planned to take a favourable decision concerning agreements between
Telenor Broadband (‘‘TBS’’), Canal+ and Canal
Digital related to the distribution of pay-TV premium content channels via the direct-to-home
(‘‘DTM’’) satellite platform of Canal Digital.54 The
agreements were entered into when Canal+ sold
its 50 per cent stake in Canal Digital to TBS and
are designed to secure ongoing supply of Canal+
content for the platform.
The main issue was that the Commission
required the parties to reduce related periods
of exclusivity in time and scope. Thus, Canal+

45. [2003] O.J. L153/1. See also [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 60–61.
46. Paras 302–303.
47. [2003] O.J. L140/1.
48. Paras 25–27, 108 and 166.
49. In October 2003, the Commission published its decision in the Methionine Cartel Case: [2003] O.J. L255/1.
See also [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 63.

50. IP/03/589, April 30, 2003; [2003] O.J. L200/59; IP/03/
1026, July 16, 2003.
51. [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 91–92.
52. [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 91–92.
53. Paras 108 and 99.
54. [2003] O.J. C149/16.

Joint ventures/horizontal co-operation
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undertook not to own a competing DTH/SMATV
(satellite master antenna network) distribution
platform in the Nordic region for 10 years (although
it could continue to supply other Nordic pay-TV
premium content channels through third-party
cable networks). This was reduced to four years
and the definition of DTH/SMATV distribution
was narrowed to cable networks.
For its part, TBS undertook not to operate a payTV premium content channel for DTH/SMATV
distribution and not to distribute such channels of
competing suppliers via DTH/SMATV and certain
smaller cable networks for 10 years. (This did not
apply to Telenor’s cable television networks.) This
was reduced to three years.
The arrangements also provided for the joint
acquisition of certain content by the parties, the
duration of which was also reduced to three years.
3G patents
In November 2002, the Commission cleared agreements for the licensing of patents for 3G mobile
services between a group of some 18 companies
called the ‘‘3G Patent Platform Partnership’’
(‘‘3G3P’’).55 In order to produce 3G equipment,
manufacturers need to comply with the ‘‘IMT2000 3G’’ standard. This standard covers five different technologies, each of which can be used to
produce 3G equipment. To make such equipment,
manufacturers need access to the patents essential
for a particular technology.
3G3P notified a set of agreements providing for
procedures to establish whether a patent is essential, to streamline licensing of those considered
essential, and to reduce the overall licence fees
paid for the entire portfolio of essential patents.
The Commission noted that ‘‘essential patents’’
may compete if two technologies compete, and has
therefore required the parties to modify these agreements so that there are now five sets of arrangements, one for each technology, instead of all the
essential patents in one platform.56
The Commission’s idea is that these five sets of
licensing arrangements will not restrict competition in the five technologies concerned. The Commission also took into account that a number of 3G
essential patent holders were not involved (including Ericsson, Nokia, Motorola and Qualcomm).

Philips/Sony 57
In August 2003, the Commission cleared a set of
agreements between Philips and Sony establishing
the worldwide ‘‘Philips/Sony’’ CD Licensing Programme and a standard joint licence agreement (the
‘‘2003 SLA’’).58
According to a complex Press Release, Philips
and Sony had co-operated for some years on R&D
in the field of optical data storage technology,
resulting in joint inventions. In that context,
Philips and Sony developed CD system standard
specifications, which were adopted by music
companies and consumer electronics manufacturers, with access to the combined patents of the
two companies. The CD system standard specifications were subsequently entered into new formats, including CD-ROM used by the computer
industry.
However, several CD manufacturers had complained that the agreements between Philips and
Sony and the standard licence agreements infringed
Articles 81 and 82 EC. After certain improvements
to the programme, the Commission concluded that
it was covered by the transfer of technology block
exemption.
The Commission also cleared the 2003 SLA to be
offered to third parties, which covers the essential
patents for compliance with the different CD specifications, after some changes.
The Commission concluded that the 2003 SLA,
as amended, did not infringe Article 81 EC because,
among other things:










55. IP/02/1651, November 12, 2002.
56. In addition, the Press Release states that: (i) each
licensing agreement is limited to essential patents only;
(ii) the agreements are not to foreclose competition in
related or downstream markets; (iii) licensing is to be on
non-discriminatory terms; (iv) commercially sensitive information is not to be exchanged; (v) 3G manufacturers are
not forced to pay for patent rights which they do not need;
and (vi) the licensing arrangements ‘‘should not’’ discourage further R&D and innovation.





The SLA recognises the right of Philips and
Sony to license their respective patents separately and to give non-assertion undertakings with regard to jointly owned patents,
whether within or outside the standard
specifications of the CD systems;
the SLA 2003 provides options for licensees
for different types of CD;
the Commission is satisfied that the patents
covered are only the essential ones (after an
independent-expert report);
licensees are only obliged to license back
their patents essential for the type(s) of CD
they have selected;
royalty payment obligations reflect the territorial scope and duration of the licensed
patents;
licensees are only required to provide Philips
with information regarding royalties bearing
CDs produced and sold;
conditions for access to a ‘‘reduced compliance royalty rate have been clarified and
made more attractive’’.
57. With thanks to Flavia Distefano for her assistance
with this section.
58. IP/03/1152, August 7, 2003.
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More information is available on Philips’s
licensing website. Apparently, Philips has also
offered a one-time credit of US$10,000 on royalties
to each EEA licensee.
REIMS II







Certain quality of service criteria (e.g. in
terms of speed of delivery) had to be met;
postal operators had to offer a low-cost
alternative for bulk and commercial mail
(called ‘‘Level 3 access’’);
the maximum agreed collective tariff for terminal dues was set at 70 per cent of the
domestic tariff until 2001;
the postal operators had to introduce a transparent cost-accounting system, designed to
allow the Commission to assess what charges
were justified for such postal termination
services.

Since 1999, the postal operators have modified
their agreements. Among other things, they have:






Admitted the accession of Swiss Post, bringing the parties to 17;
considered quality standards;
agreed on a new phased transitional period
designed to allow them to charge terminal
dues of 80 per cent of defined domestic tariffs
by 2004;
envisaged renegotiations if the geographic
structure of incoming mail of a postal operator has changed so that the receiving operator cannot cover its costs.

The Commission noted that the quality of crossborder mail delivery had improved. However, the
Commission had three big issues:


Secondly, the Commission has found that
‘‘Level 3 access’’ is not viable. The operators
have therefore proposed a new, specific
‘‘international direct mail’’ system which is
meant to offer an effective low-price alternative system to the general terminal dues.
Thirdly, taking account of the liberalisation
of outgoing cross-border mail since January
2003 (if it is not necessary to sustain universal
postal services), the parties have agreed to
offer any third-party operator competing
with a REIMS II party in such services access
to inbound cross-border mail services in its
country, at rates and conditions which are
non-discriminatory as compared to those
offered to the REIMS II party in the sender’s
country.



In April 2003, the Commission issued an Article
19(3) Notice, indicating that it planned to take a
favourable decision as regards a revised version of
the REIMS II postal terminal dues system.59 This
has now been followed up by a clearance decision.60
It may be recalled that ‘‘REIMS’’ stands for
‘‘Remuneration of Mandatory Deliveries of CrossBorder Mails’’. These agreements provide for a
phased increase in the charges which postal operators can make for completing delivery of crossborder mail to specified percentages of the
domestic tariffs concerned. The agreements were
exempted in 1999 on various conditions, notably:




First, the Commission reviewed the parties’
cost data and proposed a longer phased transitional period to 2006, going only up to 78.5
per cent of domestic tariffs. The Commission
considers that this is closer to the parties’
costs.
59. [2003] O.J. C94/3; IP/03/557, April 23, 2003.
60. IP/03/1438, October 23, 2003.



Other
Several of last year’s decisions have now also been
published.61 Thus, the Revised TACA clearance
was published in January 200362; the VISA Multilateral Interchange Fee clearance was published
in November 200263; and the IFPI Simulcasting
decision was published in April 2003.64
In August 2003, the Commission also approved a
rail joint venture through the Frejus tunnel between
France and Italy.65 In October 2003, the Commission cleared the Austrian ‘‘ARA’’ system for
the disposal of packaging waste, which was described previously.66
Distribution
Table 7: Distribution
— Interbrew:
 clearance for the dominant on conditions;
 only brewer above VRBE;
— De Beers: restrictions for efficiency for the dominant?
— Other:
 Yamaha: low fine;
 Nintendo decision: high fine—300 per cent for
deterrence.

Interbrew
In November 2002, the Commission published an
Article 19(3) Notice, indicating that it proposed to
61. In the course of the year, the Commission has also
invited comments on the British Airways/Iberia/GB
Airways co-operation, [2003] O.J. C217/2; and the British
Airways/SN Airlines co-operation, [2002] O.J. C306/4. The
latter was cleared with undertakings as regards the
Brussels–Manchester route: IP/03/350, March 10, 2003.
62. [2003] O.J. L26/53; see, further, [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 91.
63. [2002] O.J. L318/17; see also [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 90–91.
(A change concerning the French Groupement des Cartes
Bancaires was also described in a Notice: [2003] O.J.
C80/13.)
64. [2003] O.J. L107/58. This was described in detail last
year: [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 89.
65. IP/03/1148.
66. IP/03/1405, October 17, 2003; [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 88.
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take a favourable position concerning Interbrew’s
modified ‘‘tied house’’ purchasing system in
Belgium.67 This is interesting as one of the first
examples of the Commission dealing with distribution by a company above the 30 per cent ceiling
of the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption (‘‘the
VRBE’’), complicated by the fact that Interbrew had
pre-existing agreements reflecting long-term loans,
leases and sub-leases, etc.
Interbrew notified its brewery agreement for
the Horeca sector (hotels, restaurants and cafés)
in Belgium in June 2000. There were five types of
agreement: loan agreements; lease and sub-lease
agreements; concession agreements; franchise agreements; and ‘‘opening tax’’ agreements. Interbrew
was found to hold some 56 per cent of the Belgian
Horeca sector, followed by Alken/Maes (Scottish &
Newcastle) with 13 per cent, Haacht with 6 per cent
and Palm with 7 per cent. The first three focus on
Pilsner (in Interbrew’s case, Jupiler and Artois),
Palm on an amber beer. In 1999, Interbrew’s tied
market share in the Horeca sector (measured by
the amount of beer sold through some [11,000–
13,000] exclusive ‘‘Interbrew beer’’ outlets) was
some [17–22 per cent] (we are not told the precise
figures).
In the loan agreements, broadly Interbrew
loaned money or equipment in return for an obligation to sell only Interbrew beer. Typically, these
agreements were for five years. The lease and sublease agreements contained similar non-compete
provisions. The duration of the lease agreements
is nine years, renewable twice for a similar period
up to a maximum of 27 years. The franchise agreements also reflect a non-compete obligation, and
concerned concessions for the exploitation of the
franchise formula for Leffe pubs (an abbey beer),
Hoegaarden pubs (a wheat beer) and ‘‘Radio 2’’ pubs
(a concept franchise with more than one type of
Interbrew beer). Interbrew would also tender for
public authority ‘‘concessions’’ (in sports centres
etc.) and then sell only its own beer through the
outlet. Interbrew had some 100 such concessions,
with durations usually from 5–10 years. Finally,
Interbrew would sometimes pay the outlet ‘‘opening tax’’ for an operator, a financial benefit in return
for which Interbrew would require a non-compete
obligation.
As notified, the scope of the ‘‘tie’’ varied according to the type of agreement. Generally, there was an
obligation for an outlet operator to buy all his
requirements for beers and other drinks specified
in the brewery agreement from Interbrew (i.e. not
sell competing beers or drinks) (with variations
from franchise outlets). Loans and ‘‘opening tax’’
agreements entered into after March 2001 tied
draught beer only, and those from June 2001 were
terminable on three months’ notice. Agreements
after July 2001 required that the operator purchase
67. [2002] O.J. C283/14.

at least 75 per cent of his total beer turnover from
Interbrew (instead of a non-compete).
After two rounds of amendment, what the Commission required (broadly) was a reduction in the
breadth and extent of the minimum purchasing
obligation to give more access to Interbrew’s tied
outlets for other beers, save as regards draught Pils,
core distributed products. The Commission also
required shorter termination possibilities for the
operators (three months):






In the case of loan ties (which accounted for
more than 7,000 outlets), the ‘‘quantity forcing’’ obligation (exclusive or minimum purchasing obligation) only applies to draught
Pilsner, allowing operators to sell bottled or
canned Pilsner, or other types of beer
whether draught or bottled, provided that
the outlet buys at least 50 per cent of its total
beer requirements from Interbrew. Moreover,
all such agreements are now to be terminable
on three months’ notice. The outstanding
loan balance is repayable, but without an
early repayment penalty or other financial
compensation. This concerns [11–16 per cent]
of the tied share.
As regards some 2,000 loan or bank guarantee agreements which Interbrew entered into
between 1997 and 2000 with a duration of
10 years, Interbrew undertakes to terminate
the quantity forcing obligation at the latest
on December 31, 2006. (The Commission
appears to have accepted a five-year transition period beyond that provided for in the
VRBE.)
In the case of leases, the non-compete obligation is reduced in a different way to cover
all types of draught beer brewed by Interbrew
(Pilsner and others) under its own brands or
under a licence (meaning in practice Tuborg).
The operator can therefore sell draught
Trappist beer and all types of bottled or
canned beer made by competitors. Interbrew
will treat its concession agreements in the
same way as the lease or sub-lease contracts.
In the case of Leffe or Hoegaarden franchises,
Interbrew limits the non-compete obligation
to the type of beer that is the subject of the
franchise formula, subject to a minimum
purchase obligation of 25 per cent of all beer
purchases. There is no non-compete or minimum purchasing obligation for the Radio 2
franchises.

In the Commission’s Press Release for its decision in April 2003, the Commission amplified or
changed certain points68:


First, that the ‘‘50 per cent of total beer turnover requirement’’ in the loan agreements
68. IP/03/545, April 15, 2003.
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was not thought likely to have major foreclosing effects, since outlets were expected to
account for that through draught Pilsner, not
therefore limiting third-party sourcing for
other bottled or canned beers.
Secondly (although it is not entirely clear in
the Press Release), it appears that in the lease
agreements, the operator can also sell one
brand of a competitor’s draught beer, other
than draught Pilsner, instead of being limited
to Interbrew’s range of draught beers. This
‘‘guest beer’’ could therefore include wheat or
amber beer, not just beers like Trappist which
Interbrew does not sell. It appears, however,
that the ‘‘guest beer’’ will be supplied by
Interbrew or a wholesaler appointed by it
(and the Commission will review this ‘‘guest
beer’’ system after one year). Here, the Commission appears to have been influenced by
the fact that Interbrew owns the premises,
only leasing them out.

All of this is very interesting. The brewery sector
is something of a special case, but has been the
vehicle for some of the Commission’s most detailed
decisions on distribution foreclosure/market access. This is one of the first cases above the 30 per
cent market-share ceiling in the VRBE. The Commission appears to have recognised:




The need to balance the commercial interests
of a supplier which might be considered
dominant (Interbrew had 56 per cent of the
sector) and was the only market participant
outside the VRBE, with the interest of competitors (and customers) to see greater market
access; and
the commercial fact that Interbrew had a
whole network of agreements, reflecting commercial choices on both sides which one
would think cannot be radically changed
overnight.

The overall solutions do not appear that surprising. In other contexts, the Commission has allowed
dominant suppliers to have ‘‘50 per cent exclusivity’’ obligations on customers, where these may
be justified.
Practically, one may note, however, that
Interbrew’s competitors operating under the
VRBE will be allowed to impose stricter ties on
Horeca outlets (i.e. they can oblige such outlets to
buy all their beer from the supplier in exchange for a
five-year loan, or for the full duration of any lease or
sub-lease if the supplier owns the premises).
It is interesting also to see the Commission
accepting a three-month notice period without
penalty as indicating adequate switching possibilities. One senses that the Commission thinks
that one loan from one brewery could be replaced
by another loan from another—apparently also that



Interbrew’s market position will not de facto deter
such switching. Interesting material, given cases
like Masterfoods II, where the possibility of
switching on two months’ notice was rejected as
being something which in practice the outlet would
not do.
Finally, the Commission has also stressed that
it has co-operated with the Dutch competition
authority in relation to another case above the
VRBE ceiling involving Heineken69 (and, highlighting the new European Competition Network
(‘‘ECN’’) framework, that it planned a ‘‘workshop’’
with the other national competition authorities on
beer (brewery contracts)!).
De Beers diamond distribution
During the year, there have been three developments related to the De Beers diamond distribution
system.
First, in November 2002, the Commission
indicated that it planned to clear an amended new
distribution system called the Diamond Trading
Company’s (‘‘DTC’’) ‘‘Supplier of Choice’’ system
(notified in May 2001).70 This has been followed up
by a Press Release confirming the clearance in
January 2003.71
Secondly, in that same Press Release, the Commission has indicated that it objects to a trade/
supply agreement between De Beers and Alrosa
Company Ltd (‘‘Alrosa’’), a Russian state-owned
company which produces some 20 per cent of
world production of rough diamonds. Under that
agreement, Alrosa agrees to sell to De Beers some
e800 million of rough diamonds over five years
which De Beers will subsequently release on the
market. The Commission considers that this infringes Articles 81 and 82 EC and sent a Statement
of Objections to De Beers and Alrosa.
Thirdly, the Commission has cleared a joint
venture between De Beers and LVMH Moët
Hennessy Louis Vuitton (‘‘LVMH’’) for the retail of
diamond jewellery under the EC Merger Control
Regulation on the basis that this does not
strengthen the dominant position held by De Beers
in rough diamond supply. The Commission’s decision contains much information useful to understanding the Supplier of Choice and Alrosa Cases.72
What appears to be happening is that De Beers is
changing its distribution strategy. Until recently, it
controlled some 85–90 per cent of rough diamond
supply (i.e. before the diamonds are polished and
cut for jewellery). Recently, however, some smaller
competitors have started to supply the market independently. Notably, three companies, Argyle,
69. NMA decision of May 28, 2002, Case 2036/Heineken.
RBB Brief 04, August 2002, and www.nmanet.nl.
70. [2002] O.J. C273/2.
71. IP/03/64, January 16, 2003.
72. [2003] O.J. L29/40.
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Alrosa and BHP Diamonds (‘‘BHP’’), now sell
independently (although, according to the Commission’s merger decision, it appears that Alrosa
has an agreement to supply half of its production
through De Beers and DTC, and that BHP supplies
35 per cent of its output via De Beers sales channels). It appears from the Commission materials
that Argyle has less than 5 per cent of the rough
diamond market, Alrosa between 10 and 15 per cent
(independently), and BHP less than 5 per cent
(independently).73 There have been (and still are)
arguments for a concentration of supply, in order to
provide consistency and (overtly) to protect price
levels.
De Beers now controls some 60–65 per cent of
rough diamond supply and is therefore the dominant supplier.
Until recently, De Beers supplied the market
through some 120 ‘‘sightholders’’, whereby customers bought pre-prepared ‘‘lots’’ or ‘‘boxes’’ of
rough diamonds sorted by quality and cost, after
so-called ‘‘sights’’ when they saw the diamonds.
Recently, De Beers has indicated that it plans to
switch to a system whereby it will have fewer
sightholder customers, but will invest with them
in terms of giving them improved supply and access
to DTC’s marketing and branding surrounding the
DTC name, the so-called ‘‘Forevermark’’ icon and
the ‘‘A Diamond is Forever’’ advertising slogan.
Retail strategy through the LVMH joint venture
will be based on the ‘‘De Beers’’ name. Sightholders
are also to be encouraged to work more with De
Beers’ downstream partners to improve diamond
distribution.
The changes in distribution strategy are aimed at
increasing demand for De Beers diamonds.
Through the Supplier of Choice system, De Beers
essentially limits the customers through which it
will distribute, but intensifies the relationship with
them.74
As originally designed, the Commission considered that the system constituted not only an
infringement of Article 81 EC but also an infringement of Article 82 EC because of the criteria for
sightholder selection and the amount of information sought. Under the system, De Beers sought
much detailed and confidential information on
their customers’ operations. Based on that information, De Beers intended to select a limited number of sightholders with which it would do business
and to determine the allocation of diamonds which
each might receive. After the Commission’s intervention, this has been reduced. For example, the
number of questions involved in the De Beers questionnaire has been reduced from 60 to 21, with
corresponding changes to the rest of the system.
73. The Commission’s merger decision at paras 46 and
58–59.
74. The Commission’s merger decision at paras 77 et seq.
and the Art.19(3) Notice referred to above.



Sightholders also do not have to reveal their marketing or promotional initiatives to DTC, save where
DTC support is sought.
Various sightholder (selection) criteria were
involved in the system as originally designed, relating to the strength of the sightholder and compliance with certain ‘‘best practice’’ principles,
including an obligation not to handle artificially
treated/synthetic diamonds. The latter has now
been removed after the Commission’s intervention.
De Beers also sought greater information on the
market, although the Commission appears to have
considered that it had enough already, partly because De Beers also has sales subsidiaries selling to
the secondary market (one level after the sightholders) and polishing operations of its own.
Under the Supplier of Choice system, DTC is not
obliged to offer boxes to sightholders, although DTC
is to use reasonable endeavours to meet applications.
The Commission appears to have been concerned that the system left sightholders too dependent on DTC, giving De Beers too much scope to
restrict their commercial behaviour, and therefore
has intervened and accepted a new ‘‘Ombudsman’’
dispute resolution system (in addition to existing
arbitration and litigation possibilities). The
Ombudsman is to consider whether DTC has followed improper procedures in its decisions on
selection or deselection of sightholders, and also
in relation to DTC’s supply decisions.
Sightholders are appointed for two-year periods
with a six month termination notice period (instead
of three months). According to the Article 19(3)
Notice, supplies are also to be based on six-month
purchasing requirement indications. Sightholders
will be able to buy only the boxes they have applied
for and after inspecting the stones.
Sightholders no longer have to renounce any
claims against De Beers relating to the period before
the Supplier of Choice arrangements.
The Commission’s approval appears somewhat
tentative as it states the system could still be used to
artificially reduce supply. It appears that, for the
moment at least, the Commission is more focused
on opening up other channels of supply. Hence its
challenge to the Alrosa arrangements. Nevertheless, although very exceptional, this is an interesting and rare example of a dominant supplier
apparently being able to modify its distribution
structure with related restrictions to promote efficiency and competition.
Audi authorised services and repair network
In January 2003, the Commission indicated that it
had intervened as regards Audi’s authorised service network75 after complaints from dealers and
75. IP/03/80, January 20, 2003, and SPEECH/03/59,
February 6, 2003, at p.4; Gambs, EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter, no.2 (Summer 2003), pp.53–55.
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authorised Audi repairers concerning termination
of dealer or authorised repairer agreements before
the end of the transition period to the new Motor
Vehicle Block Exemption (‘‘MVBE’’).
In a complex Press Release, the Commission set
out its position that car manufacturers’ agreements
with service repairers which do not also sell cars
were not covered by the old MVBE and could
therefore only reflect qualitative selection criteria,
even before the end of the transitional period.
Agreements with car dealers which also involved service repairs benefited from Regulation
1475/95 until October 1, 2003 and could therefore
involve quantitative restrictions. However, the existence of such agreements was no ground for not
applying purely qualitative criteria in other cases.
The Commission emphasised that car dealers
performing service and repair obligations whose
agreements had been terminated before the end of
the transitional period should also qualify as service repairers under the current qualitative criteria.
Independent pure service repairers should also
already have the same opportunity.
Audi agreed to follow this approach. As a result,
various dealer or repairer agreements were reinstated in the VW network, apparently as authorised
repairers. The Commission has indicated that
Volkswagen is also doing so, as is Opel.

‘‘object’’ of such practices being to restrict competition, more than discussing effects. Yamaha is
stated to have terminated ‘‘a majority’’ of the restrictions as soon as the Commission intervened. It is
not clear what duration was involved.
Otherwise, this is a classic area of practical
concern, as companies feel the need for some
territorial restrictions within a selective distribution system (limiting cross-sales within the network), even though that may be blacklisted in the
VRBE.
Nintendo decision
In October 2003, the Commission published its
Nintendo decision.78 It will be recalled that this
case involved parallel import restrictions on markets for game consoles and cartridges such as the
‘‘Game Boy’’ system. The Commission fined not
only Nintendo, but also various distributors, and
the fine on Nintendo was a record e149,000 million
for a ‘‘vertical’’ infringement.
The decision explains how this high level was
reached. Essentially, the Commission found that:




Yamaha
In July 2003, the Commission imposed a fine of
e2.56 million on Yamaha for restricting trade in the
European Union and fixing resale prices.76
It appears that Yamaha pursued a number of
practices, including obligations on official dealers:
to sell only to final customers; to purchase exclusively from Yamaha subsidiaries; to contact Yamaha
before exporting via the internet; and the fixing
of resale prices. The Commission indicated that
such activities concerned Germany, Italy, France,
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and
Iceland.
Although the Commission notes that such an
infringement is ‘‘serious’’, it appears to have
imposed a very moderate fine. It will be interesting
to see more precisely why when the decision is
published.
There have been low or no fines for limited
parallel import cases before (e.g. Triumph motor
cycles).77 Clearly, however, there have also been the
huge fines like Nintendo. From the Press Release, it
appears that the Yamaha infringement was more
sporadic than systematic, being applied only to a
limited number of dealers and products, not being
systematically included in all Yamaha agreements
in the EEA, and that the restrictions were not fully
implemented. The Press Release also speaks of the
76. IP/03/1028, July 16, 2003.
77. IP/00/1014, September 15, 2000.





The infringement was very serious and EEAwide;
Nintendo’s position should be given more
specific weight;
Nintendo’s basic amount should be
increased by 300 per cent for deterrence,
taking into account its size and overall resources, and that it was the manufacturer of
the products concerned;
Nintendo continued its infringement, after
the Commission had started an investigation
into EU video game prices and specifically
Nintendo in 1995, justifying a 25 per cent
increase.

Although the Commission treated the infringement as vertical and denied Nintendo and others
the specific application of the (cartel) Leniency
Notice, much of the decision reads like a cartel
case, with classic references to case law on agreements and concerted practices.
The Commission also allowed Nintendo and
John Menzies analogous reductions for their cooperation with the Commission. In Nintendo’s
case, this was 25 per cent.
Interestingly, Nintendo was also given a reduction in its fine of e300,000 million for ‘‘substantial financial compensation to third parties
identified in the Statement of Objections as having
suffered financial harm’’.79,80
78. [2003] O.J. L255/33; [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 97.
79. Paras 440, 441.
80. In June 2003, the Commission indicated that it had
opened proceedings against Topps for practices designed
to prevent imports of Pokémon collectible stickers and
cards from EU countries where these are low-priced to
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Articles 82/86 EC
Deutsche Telekom
Table 8: Articles 82/86 EC
— Deutsche Telekom:
 margin squeeze;
 wholesale access compared to several retail
products;
 weighted approach;
 EC intervention although NRA review;
— IMS: interim measures withdrawn.

In May 2003, the Commission adopted a decision
fining Deutsche Telekom (‘‘DT’’) some e12.6
million for what it considered an abusive margin
squeeze for wholesale access to the final (or ‘‘local’’)
telecommunications loop between the last switch
and the household.81
The Commission found that DT was dominant
on the markets for wholesale and retail access to the
local loop. As regards wholesale access, DT is the
only network operator offering nationwide retail
coverage in Germany. There are other forms of
technical infrastructure (fibre optic and wireless
networks, satellites and upgraded TV networks)
but the Commission found them not sufficiently
developed to be equivalent to DT’s network.
After a complex assessment, the Commission
considered that DT had been ‘‘margin-squeezing’’.
In other words, the Commission found that there
was an insufficient spread between DT’s (wholesale) local loop access prices and DT’s downstream
tariffs for retail subscriptions. As a result, third-party
competitors could not compete for end customers.
The Commission found that, from 1998 to 2001,
DT had charged competitors more for unbundled
access at wholesale level than it charged its subscribers for access at the retail level, leaving
competitors no margin to compete for the retail
subscribers. From 2002, prices for wholesale access
were lower than for retail access, but the Commission found that the difference was still not
enough to cover DT’s own downstream productspecific costs for the supply of end-user services.
The Commission stated that it had reduced the
fine in two ways. First, it had not increased the basic
amount of the fine for the period from 2002 onwards
‘‘due to the reduced scope for price adjustments’’
under German regulation. Secondly, the Commission reduced the basic amount by 10 per cent
‘‘because of legal uncertainty about the tariffs under
scrutiny’’.82
This is an interesting and complex case. There
are three big issues.
First, the calculation of the margin squeeze is new
and complex. The Commission had to compare the
others where they are high-priced for most of the year 2000:
IP/03/866, June 19, 2003.
81. IP/03/717, May 21, 2003; [2003] O.J. L263/9.
82. Press Release, p.2.



single wholesale service (local loop access) to several retail services (access to analogue, ISDN and
ADSL connections), in itself a complex task, leaving scope for differing interpretations. The Commission decided it could do so and then applied a
‘‘weighted approach’’ to prices and costs, aggregating retail access for analogue, ISDN and ADSL on
the basis of the number of each variant that DT had
marketed to its own end-users.
The ‘‘comparable’’ wholesale and retail services
were found to be fully unbundled local loop access
and retail access in analogue, ISDN and ADSL. The
Commission found that:




If the average retail prices are below the level
of the wholesale charges, there is a margin
squeeze.
If DT’s average retail costs were above its
wholesale charges, then the Commission
looked at DT’s product-specific costs for providing its own retail services, and considered
that there was a margin squeeze if those costs
exceeded the ‘‘positive spread’’ between the
retail and wholesale prices. DT argued,
among other things, that this was too narrow
an approach and that revenues for call services (which also feature in the overall
pricing decisions) should also have been
taken into account.

As the Commission acknowledged on fining,
this is new, and previously the weighted method
applied to determine the margin squeeze has not
been the subject of a formal Commission decision.
The Commission’s decision should be very important to network industries in similar positions.83
Secondly, there is much controversy over the
extent of scope for autonomous conduct which DT
had in the case where DT’s wholesale prices were
regulated (apparently at what the German regulatory authority considered to be cost level). DT’s
retail prices were also regulated, albeit in a different
way. Both had been regulated by the German
authorities and the German regulator had also considered the issue of a price squeeze.
The Commission argued that DT could still have
increased its retail charges to increase the spread
between wholesale and retail prices,84 and that
national action does not prevent the Commission
applying the EC competition rules. DT also argued
that this is at odds with its obligations to provide
affordable universal services, while the Commission argued that a restructuring of the tariffs
concerned could still achieve that.85
Thirdly, DT argued that the Commission was in
effect applying a per se rule, since no negative
effects on the market were shown. The Commission

83. Decision, Paras 102–111 and 206.
84. Paras 53–57.
85. Paras 192–198.
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argued that it was enough if it proved the existence
of the margin squeeze, referring to case law such as
Hoffmann La Roche and AKZO.86 However, the
Commission also considered that the margin
squeeze did raise barriers to entry, noting that few
competitors had entered the market thus far.
DT has appealed.
Wanadoo Interactive
In July 2003, the Commission also fined Wanadoo
Interactive, a subsidiary of France Telecom, some
e10.35 million for predatory pricing in ADSLbased internet access services to the general public.87 The Commission considered that between
1999 and 2002, Wanadoo marketed its ADSL services at prices below their average costs (before
August 2001, below variable costs; afterwards,
equivalent to variable costs, but below total costs)
while France Telecom was expecting significant
profits for its wholesale ADSL provision to internet
service providers (including Wanadoo). In effect,
the Commission argued that this was a deliberate
policy to take the market for high-speed internet
access, as it was first introduced. The abuse was
found to have ended in October 2002 when France
Telecom reduced its wholesale ADSL prices by
some 30 per cent. We have not yet seen the decision.
IMS
In August 2003, the Commission withdrew its
interim measures decision again IMS.88 The
Frankfurt Oberlandesgericht had ruled that, while
IMS Health’s 1860 brick structure is protected by
German copyright, NDC Health (IMS’s rival) can
develop another brick structure similarly based on
administrative and postal divisions, ‘‘even if the
resulting structure might have a similar number of
brick segments to the 1860 structure and might be
deemed to be derived from that structure’’. It also
appears that since then, NDC has signed a number
of contracts, some with bigger pharmaceutical
firms, and therefore may be able to stay on the
market. In addition, AzyX, another would-be
competitor of IMS in Germany, has withdrawn
from the German market. The Commission therefore considers that there is no urgency justifying an
interim measures decision requiring IMS to license
its copyright to NDC.
On the facts, however, NDC’s German subsidiary
was found to have infringed German unfair competition law by copying IMS’s 1860 structure and
using it. (In another case, the Landgericht Frankfurt
has made a reference to the ECJ on these issues.89)
86. Paras 176–180.
87. IP/03/1025, July 16, 2003.
88. IP/03/1159, August 13, 2003; [2003] O.J. L268/69.
89. Case C-418/01, Notice of action brought on January 5,
2002, [2002] O.J. C-3/23.



Italian railways
In August 2003, the Commission announced that it
had followed through and adopted a decision in its
case involving access to Italian railways for an
operator seeking to offer a service from Germany
to Milan via Basle.90 The Ferrovie dello Stato (‘‘FS’’)
had refused to offer traction services and refused to
discuss terms for access to track. In the circumstances, FS was considered to be the only undertaking/operator able to offer such services. FS
settled the case and agreed to deal with these issues,
or at least to use its best endeavours to do so. The
Commission emphasised that, in the circumstances, for FS not to do so would be considered
an abuse of its dominant position.
Other
In January 2003, the Commission published its
readopted decision in the Soda Ash, Solvay Rebates Case.91 As with the Soda Ash Cartel Case, the
text is essentially the same, save that there is a
section dealing with the appeal which led to annulment of the decision for lack of proper authentication/signature. Again, the time taken on appeal is
striking—amounting to almost nine years. Solvay
has now appealed again on the substance.
In March 2003, the Commission announced that
it had sent a Statement of Objections to Clearstream
Banking AG.92 The Commission considered that
Clearstream is the dominant supplier of clearing
and financial settlement services for securities
issued under German law. Clearstream is the German
Central Securities Depository. The Commission’s
objections relate to an alleged refusal to allow
Euroclear Bank SA access to settlement services
for German-registered shares for some two years,
while Clearstream established a competing crossborder operation. The Commission also alleged
that Clearstream was discriminatory, since other
customers were given access much more quickly.
Moreover, until January 2002, Clearstream charged
a higher per transaction price to Euroclear than to
national Central Securities Depositories outside
Germany. In the Commission’s view, this is not
justified.
In July 2003, the Commission sent Astra Zeneca
a Statement of Objections, alleging that it had
misused the patent system and other regulatory
procedures for the marketing of pharmaceuticals
in order to block or delay market entry for generic
products.93
90. IP/03/1182, August 28, 2003; the decision is available
on the Commission’s website.
91. [2003] O.J. L10/10.
92. IP/03/462, March 31, 2003. See also, in this field, Mr
Monti’s speech: ‘‘The integration of European capital market infrastructures and competition law’’, SPEECH/02/
614, December 5, 2002.
93. IP/03/1136, July 31, 2003.
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The Commission contended that, contrary to
Article 82 EC, Astra Zeneca concealed the date on
which it first received its marketing authorisation
for a product called Losec, used in the treatment of
stomach ulcers and other acid-related diseases. As
a result, Astra Zeneca obtained supplementary protection certificates for Losec, extending its patent
protection. It is also alleged that Astra Zeneca
switched Losec from a capsule formulation to a
tablet formulation and requested national medicines agencies to de-register the market authorisations for the capsules, making it more difficult for
generic producers to obtain marketing authorisations and for parallel importers to obtain related
import licences.
Otherwise, we await events concerning the
Microsoft and Coca-Cola Cases.94 On Microsoft,
the Commission indicated in the summer that it
had sent Microsoft a further Statement of Objections.95 The Commission’s position was that
Microsoft is leveraging its ‘‘overwhelming dominant position from the PC into low-end servers, the
computers which provide core services to PCs in
corporate networks’’. Otherwise, the Commission’s
position was that Microsoft’s tying of Windows
Media Player to the Windows operating system
was unlawful. It appears that the Commission has
also given Microsoft the opportunity to comment
on proposed remedies. On the first alleged infringement, ‘‘core disclosure obligations’’ to allow interface by rival vendors of low-end services are being
considered. On the second alleged infringement,
there is discussion of untying Windows Media
Player from Windows or requiring Mircosoft to
offer competing media players (a so-called ‘‘must
carry’’ provision). The hearings were set for early
November.96

Current policy issues
Table 9: Current policy issues
— Liberal professions:
 Vienna study;
 key restrictions: prices, advertising (and more?);
 persuade greater action because of public
regulation?
— Liner conference block exemption:
 can the Commission convince the Member States
to review it?
 not clear;
— Modernisation of Art.82 EC:
 more movement on Art.81(3) EC than the concept
of abuse.

94. Reuters, February 11 and June 19, 2003.
95. IP/03/1150, August 6, 2003.
96. It appears a new complaint against Microsoft was also
filed this spring, in relation to its Windows XP system:
Reuters and New York Times, February 11, 2003.



Liberal professions
The Commission is continuing to advocate more
competition for liberal professions. At the end of
last year, the Commission engaged the Institute of
Advanced Studies in Vienna to study facts concerning the regulation of lawyers and notaries,
architects and engineers, auditors and accountants, and medical practitioners and pharmacists
in the European Union. The consultants were also
asked to do a representative cost-benefit analysis of
the regulation of some professions.
During the year, the Commission has explained
its position more clearly. Put shortly, it appears to
be that variations in the degree of regulation in
different Member States show that some restrictions in some Member States are disproportionate
and not objectively justified. If removed, they may
expand the market for the services concerned.97
Just recently, in October 2003, the Commission
has released the results of the Vienna Study on the
Commission’s website and held a conference on the
subject of the regulation of professional services.
Among other things, it has published a list of the
key restrictions for each profession in different
Member States and has suggested that, through
Arts 10 and 81 EC and the Italian Matches case,
there may be ways to push change further.
These issues need careful evaluation. Many
rules reflect consumer interests, as well as those
of the professionals concerned. Many rules also
reflect value judgments concerning objective justifications for the rules concerned, or economic
assessments which may also be quite valid. After
Wouters, it is also clear that national variations may
be allowed.
While one can understand what the Commission
is doing to advocate competition in services, one
should therefore not infer too easily from comparative studies that any evaluation of relative standards must be to the least demanding standard.
On the other hand, there may be a case for modernisation of some rules, allowing for increased
competition.
The Commission’s idea now appears to be to
persuade the Member States that some liberalisation of these areas would be beneficial, even
though there may be recognised grounds for
specific (often self-) regulation of the professions
concerned. The Commission appears to be
targeting pricing and advertising restrictions first.
A key point is that many restrictions stem from
national legislation, as opposed to private agreements.98 It is likely to be a lively debate for some
years to come.
97. Speech by Mr Monti to the German Federal Bar
Association (Bundesanwaltskammer), March 21, 2003,
SPEECH/03/149, available on the Commission’s website
and as IP/03/420, March 21, 2003.
98. 2002 EC Commission Competition Report, paras
197–209.
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This has been coming for some time, flanked by
some EC and national competition decisions, notably in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

Review of liner conference block
exemption99
In March 2003, the Commission published a Consultation Paper on the justification for a continued
block exemption for liner conferences,1 contained
in Regulation 4056/86. Since then, various responses
have been posted on the Commission’s website and
the Commission has continued to advocate that
the liner conference block exemption should be
reviewed.
Essentially, the Commission argues that:






The exemption is too generous, in so far as it
allows horizontal price-fixing and limitation
of output, and is unlimited in time;
it is now some 16 years old and ‘‘[un]like wine
there is no evidence that block exemptions
improve with age’’.2 In other words, market
conditions may have changed;
the benefits therefore need to be specifically
justified, showing that there are not less restrictive solutions (following an approach,
the Commission has also applied to other
block exemptions recently).

The Commission also notes that with Regulation
1/2003, the possibility for further individual exemptions has ended.
Against this, one may note that like Regulation
26/62 for agriculture, this block exemption is a
special case, since it was adopted to supplement
the rules of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for liner
conferences. In other words, part of the reasoning
behind the exemption was trade considerations in
transport, which may still be live issues.
Equally, there is extensive debate on the benefits
of the stability given to the trades concerned. As the
Commission has predicted, there is now likely to be
a protracted debate, not least because the liner
conference block exemption is embedded in a
Council Regulation, so again the Member States
must be convinced to change.

more effect-based assessments. US lawyers have
also advocated closer parallels to US law. On the
other hand, the European Court has maintained its
case law on the concept of abuse, focusing on rules
operating in markets ‘‘weakened by dominance’’, in
cases such as Michelin. (The Court has also rejected
claims that US law would give different results as
not relevant.)
It appears as a result that more reflection is
required on how usefully to modernise the abuse
concept in the European context. In the meantime,
as noted above, the Commission appears to be
emphasising that Article 81(3) EC clearance can
be used by the dominant—in the IP Guidelines, the
draft Guidelines on Article 81(3) EC and cases like
Interbrew.

Areas of specific interest
Table 10: Competition and gas supply
— Danish gas supply—joint marketing ended and gas to
new customers
— Further Marathon settlements:
 improved access to pipeline capacity;
 entry and exit fees, not contractual paths;
— Gazprom:
 territorial restrictions removed and ‘‘Italian’’ gas to
third parties?

Competition and gas supply
‘‘Acceleration Directive’’
In November 2002, the EU Member States reached
political agreement on the so-called ‘‘Acceleration
Directive’’ to increase liberalisation in the electricity and gas sectors.4 The main points are:







Modernisation of Article 82 EC enforcement
Ideas have been aired this year to modernise Article
82 EC.3 It is an interesting thought, because so much
of Commission modernisation is about moving to
99. With thanks to Oleh Malskyy for his assistance with
this section.
1. On the Commission’s website.
2. Speech by Mr Monti, June 12, 2003, SPEECH/03/294,
available on the Commission’s website.
3. See n.53, above.





Market opening for all non-domestic gas and
electricity customers from July 1, 2004, and
for all other customers, including private
households, from July 1, 2007;
reinforced universal service obligations;
legal and functional unbundling for transmission system operators as of July 1, 2004
(phased to July 1, 2007 for distribution system operators);
regulated third-party access for transmission, distribution and liquefied natural
gas facilities. For storage, EU Member States
can choose between regulated and negotiated
third-party access regimes;
regulatory authorities to be established for
network access tariffs.

4. IP/02/1733, November 26, 2002.
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Danish gas supply
In April 2003, the Commission announced that,
with the Danish Competition Authority, it had
settled an investigation into the joint marketing of
North Sea gas by the Danish Underground Consortium (‘‘DUC’’) composed of A.P. Moeller and Chevron Texaco.5 The investigation started in July 2001.
DUC argued that the arrangements were covered by
the Specialisation Block Exemption. The Commission disagreed. Without prejudice to their position, the three DUC companies agreed to cease
their joint marketing and to market their gas individually in future.
Moreover, they agreed to offer some 7 billion
cubic metres of gas for sale to new customers over a
period of five years starting January 1, 2005, or
earlier if new gas volumes were available before
then. This would amount to some 1.4 billion cubic
metres per year, i.e. 17 per cent of the total production of the DUC parties.
The investigation also concerned certain gas
supply agreements between the DUC and DONG,
the incumbent Danish gas supplier. It appears that
there were gas sales agreements between DONG
and each of the DUC partners. Through these agreements, they satisfied Danish demand and supplied
additional volumes to Sweden and Germany.
Certain provisions have now been terminated:






A provision obliging DONG to report to the
DUC the volumes sold to certain categories of
customers in order to obtain a discount or
special prices;
an obligation imposed on the DUC partners to
offer all their future gas finds first to DONG.
Here, DONG has committed not to buy the
volumes dedicated by the DUC partners to
new customers, and not to buy any new DUC
gas from April 2003 until three years after the
start of a new pipeline which is being built to
link the Danish gas fields with the existing
infrastructure to the European continent.
The pipeline is expected to be operational
by January 1, 2005 at the latest;
a so-called ‘‘necessary adjustment mechanism’’, under which DONG claimed the right to
reduce the amount of gas it would buy from
the DUC partners if they started to sell gas
onto the Danish market. DONG argued that it
needed this as protection for its ‘‘take or pay’’
obligations in the agreements. The competition authorities accepted this as long as
DONG had limited connection possibilities
to sell gas outside Denmark. However, DONG
agreed to waive the provision six months
after the new pipeline starts.

DONG has also agreed to introduce an improved
access regime for its off-shore pipelines linking the
Danish gas fields to Denmark.
The competition authorities state that they expect this commitment to facilitate competition
in Denmark and also in countries such as the
Netherlands and Germany.

Further Marathon settlements
In April and July 2003, the Commission announced
that it had continued with the Marathon Case, and
had settled with Gasunie and BEB (having settled
the case with Thyssengas in November 2001).6
The case concerns the alleged joint refusal to
grant access to continental European gas pipelines
by a group of five European gas companies. The
Norwegian subsidiary of the US company Marathon complained. There does not appear to be a live
issue with Marathon after an out-of-court settlement, but in practice the parties have amended the
underlying practices related to the dispute in order
to settle the Commission proceedings.
Stating that the Commission had worked closely
with the Dutch energy regulator, Dte, the Commission indicated that it was closing the case
against Gasunie after several commitments. These
are that Gasunie will:






Publish on its website the contracted transport capacity at all entry and all major
exit points of its gas network, improving
transparency as to available transmission
capacity;
introduce an online balancing system to
avoid high prices for gas supplied by Gasunie
because of an unexpected increase/or decrease by one of its customers; and
improve handling of access requests through
online screen-based booking procedures
which are particularly relevant for shortterm trading.

Furthermore, Gasunie has undertaken to offer to
link other pipelines to its own system. It appears
that Gasunie has already improved its access
regime through various measures, including
short-term transport contracts for one day, and a
so-called ‘‘entry/exit system’’ to deal with ‘‘fictitious’’ transport of gas (which enters the system
but is not actually transported, other gas being
taken off elsewhere to supply the order in question).
Under the system, shippers only have to book
capacity at entry and exit but do not have to pay
for gas transport according to so-called ‘‘contractual
transport paths’’ which may not coincide with the
physical gas flows.
6. IP/03/547, April 16, 2003; IP/03/1129, July 29, 2003;
[2003] I.C.C.L.R. 111.

5. IP/03/566, April 24, 2003.
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The commitments will remain in place until
January 2007.
As regards BEB, the position is fairly similar.
BEB is owned by ExxonMobil and Shell. Marathon
sought access to its Northern German pipeline
network, which was refused. To settle the proceedings, BEB has undertaken to:









Publish on its website available transport
capacity at all entry and major exit points of
its transmission network, as well as availability of storage capacity;
introduce an online balancing system and a
bulletin board for shippers to co-operate on
transport and storage. BEB will also allow
companies to use its storage facilities in defined circumstances;
offer online screen-based booking procedures;
apply a ‘‘use it or lose it’’ principle for transport capacity reservations of its own gas
trading branch (so that others can use it as
appropriate) and to allow customers to lease
or sub-lease capacity; and
introduce an entry/exit regime similar to that
for Gasunie. Prices no longer relate to ‘‘contractual paths’’. Apparently, BEB has also
agreed to consider extending the system
throughout Germany (presumably if other
adjacent pipeline operators agree).

The commitments will remain in place until
January 2007. Apparently, the Marathon case is
continuing for two more operators.
Territorial restrictions—Nigeria and Gazprom
In December 2002, the Commission closed its investigation into the European gas supply agreements of the Nigerian gas company NLNG.7 The
Commission was concerned about territorial sales
restrictions and other barriers to onward intra-EU
sales. It is not clear from the Commission’s Press
Release what the Commission found, other than a
territorial sales restriction in one agreement. (It
appears that NLNG is the second largest supplier
of liquefied natural gas (‘‘LNG’’) to Europe, with
some 5 billion cubic metres of gas shipped every
year to customers in Italy, Spain, France and
Portugal.)
NLNG has agreed:






To release the customer bound by the territorial sales provision and not to introduce
such provisions in future supply agreements;
not to introduce use restrictions in future
supply agreements (preventing buyers from
using gas for purposes other than those
agreed); and
that the agreements do not include profitsplitting mechanisms, whereby if gas is sold
7. IP/02/1869, December 12, 2002.



across borders or for uses other than those
agreed upon, then the supplier receives a
share of the profits (and not to introduce
such provisions in the future).
In October 2003, the Commission announced a
settlement in its long-standing case against the
territorial restrictions in the gas supply agreement
between the Russian gas supplier Gazprom and the
Italian gas supplier ENI.8
As regards the agreement concerned, the
companies agreed to delete the territorial sales
restrictions from their existing long-term gas
supply agreements and not to introduce such
clauses in new contracts. They also agreed to delete
a provision which obliges Gazprom to obtain ENI’s
consent when selling gas to other customers in
Italy.
In addition, ENI has agreed to offer significant
gas volumes to customers outside Italy over five
years. If ENI does not sell enough by a defined date,
it is to organise an auction for certain gas volumes at
Baumgarten on the Austrian–Slovakian border
where Russian gas is delivered to a number of
European customers. ENI also agreed to increase
capacity on the Trans-Austria Gazleitung (‘‘TAG’’)
transit pipeline and offer an improved third-party
access regime on the pipeline.

Telecoms—leased-lines sectoral enquiry
In December 2002, the Commission closed its sectoral enquiry into leased lines, on the basis that the
issues relating to high prices and possible discrimination were now being addressed.9 Notably, the
Commission found that leased-line prices had considerably decreased and that national regulatory
authorities were being more proactive. The Commission closed its specific investigations in
Belgium and Italy, but has kept them open (together
with pressure on the parties to reduce prices) in
Spain, while ‘‘closely monitoring’’ the situation in
Portugal and Greece.

Sport and media
For reasons of space, the author does not propose to
go into the details of sport in the paper this year.
However, the author will just note the main events
for those following it:


The Commission opened proceedings
against the joint selling of media rights concerning the English Premier League in
December 2002.10
8. IP/03/1345, October 6, 2003.
9. IP/02/1852, December 11, 2002; EC Commission 2002
Annual Report, paras 101–103.
10. IP/02/1951, December 20, 2002.

[2004] I.C.C.L.R., ISSUE 3 c SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

74 RATLIFF: MAJOR EVENTS AND POLICY ISSUES IN EC COMPETITION LAW, 2002–03 (PART 2): [2004] I.C.C.L.R.







In May 2003, the Commission closed its
investigation into Audiovisual Sport after
Sogecable and Telefonica’s Via Digital
merged.11
In the same month, the Commission indicated that it had cleared ticketing arrangements for the Olympic Games in Athens in
2004.12
The Commission has adopted a decision
exempting the joint selling arrangements of
UEFA for the media rights to the Champions
League,13 and has published a Notice



proposing clearance of the joint selling of
the media rights to the German Bundesliga.14
In October 2003, the Commission indicated
that it was ceasing monitoring of the FIA/
Formula One settlement.15

Finally, in the spring of 2003, the Commission
indicated that it was investigating whether
Hollywood film studios and European pay-TV
have been colluding to fix the prices and terms for
movie rights distributed in the European Union.16

14. IP/03/1106, July 24, 2003; [2003] O.J. C261/13. There
are also recent speeches on these issues on the Commission’s website by Herbert Ungerer, Jurgen Mensching
and Miguel Pereira.
15. IP/03/1491, October 31, 2003.
16. Financial Times, January 15, 2003.

11. IP/03/655, May 8, 2003.
12. IP/03/738, May 23, 2003.
13. IP/03/1105, July 23, 2003.
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